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ABSTRACT
Framing of crisis events is to a large extent contested, with multiple sources and conflicting
messages. Theories of crisis communication acknowledge how people try to deal with these
competing messages, and this article seeks to deepen the understanding the process of sense
making of crisis events by connecting crisis communication to the spiral of silence theory. The
spiral of silence theory, founded by Elisabeth Noelle-Neuman, proposes that people are less
willing to express their opinions if they believe their beliefs are shared by a minority. This will lead
to a spiral in which those who feel their opinions are popular are more inclined to express their
opinions, and those who perceive their opinions are unpopular among the public become more
silent. This study analyzed changes over time in the willingness to express opinions about the
refugee crisis in Europe using a two-wave Web-panel survey (N = 1,185) in Sweden in 2015–2016.
The focus is the impact of changing government policy, which moved from a generous refugee
policy toward a more restrictive policy. Changes toward a more restrictive refugee policy did
not seem to change the overall picture. Those supporting a more restrictive policy were still less
inclined to speak their true opinions about the refugee crisis, even if the policy had changed in
their favor. On the other hand, respondents supporting a more generous refugee policy seemed
to become more cautious about expressing their opinions about the refugee crisis after the policy
change, especially when talking to strangers.
KEYWORDS: Spiral of silence; crisis communication; opinion change; refugee crisis;
interpersonal communication

Framing of crisis events is to a large extent contested (Boin, t’Hart,
& McConnell, 2009; Frandsen & Johansen, 2017; Seeger & Sellnow,
2016). Even if risk and crisis communication research largely focus
on how to create best practices for designing and disseminating crisis
communications and reaching a common public understanding of
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crisis situations, it is also pointed out that crisis events take place in
situations of framing contest (Frandsen & Johansen, 2017; Heath &
O’Hair, 2010; Seeger & Sellnow, 2016). Questions of contest can be, Is
there actually a crisis going on? Who is responsible for the upcoming
situation? How can it be solved? What is the proper way of dealing
with the crises? These questions will be addressed by decision makers,
organizations, news media, and citizens, and crisis decisions are thus
made in an environment of competing messages (Boin, t’Hart, Stern, &
Sundelius, 2005).
When discussing citizens’ perceptions of crisis events, we have to
consider how this frame contest affects the sense making of a crisis. Risk
and crisis communication has shown how people use different strategies to make sense of an uncertain situation (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013;
Vigsø & Odén, 2016). One example of these strategies is convergence
theory, which focuses on the ways in which individuals make sense of
competing information by collecting and contemplatinge information
from different sources and discussing this information with family,
friends, and neighbors (Anthony, Sellnow, & Millner, 2013; Sellnow,
Ulmer, Seeger, & Littlefield, 2009). However, one possible problem with
the process of sense making might be that all these communication
opportunities are not always at hand. In crises with competing frames,
people might not always be comfortable expressing what they really
think about different aspects of the crisis. Some speak out and discuss
controversial issues with their families, friends at work, or even people
they do not know. Others stay silent and are afraid to let others know
what they really think about the issue at hand.
This article seeks to deepen the understanding the process of sense
making of crisis events by connecting crisis communication to the spiral
of silence theory. Even if theories of crisis communication acknowledge
that people try to deal with competing messages, it has not taken into
consideration the social dynamics of the sense-making process. The
spiral of silence might be a way to further understand how people react
to and communicate in times of crisis.
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Literature Review
The Spiral of Silence

The spiral of silence theory proposes that people are less willing to
express their opinions when they believe their beliefs are shared by a
minority (Noelle-Neuman, 1984). We are sensitive to our surrounding
social environment and will not speak out if we fear becoming socially
isolated. This will lead to a spiral in which those who feel their opinions are popular are more inclined to express their opinions and those
who perceive their opinions are unpopular among the public become
more silent.
The spiral of silence is seen as one of the most influential theories
of communication and political communication over the last halfcentury (Donsbach, Salmon, & Tsfati, 2016) and has been tested in
numerous studies. The general conclusion of meta-analyses shows a
general but weak relationship between the perceived opinion climate
and respondents’ willingness to express their opinions (Glynn, Hayes,
& Shanahan, 1997; Glynn & Huge, 2016).
But the theory has been criticized and studies have been contested
for a number of reasons. The spiral of silence theory is so complex and
contains so many assumptions that the whole theory has never been
(and probably never will be) comprehensively tested (Matthes & Hayes,
2016). Scholars have, over the years, separated the model into manageable parts, but still, after almost 40 years of research, we find research
criticizing everything from the assumptions and the generalizability
to the design and how to measure key concepts of the theory (Hayes,
2007; Matthes & Hayes, 2016; Neuwirth, Frederick, & Mayo, 2007).
One major critical point in previous research is how research has
failed to capture the dynamics of the theory. As Matthes and Hayes
(2016) argued, research has neglected to observe the spiral in the theory
because of improper research design. Most studies use cross-sectional
data or aggregate data; the former can only capture a frozen moment of
the phenomena, and the latter have an ecology fallacy problem (Matthes & Hayes, 2016). Whether people actually change their willingness
to speak out because of the opinion climate is, to a large extent, still
unknown.
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As stated previously, the general aim of this article is to use the spiral
of silence in studying crisis communication, but the purpose is also to
deepen the knowledge of the dynamics of the spiral of silence theory.
Therefore this work builds on panel data from Sweden in 2015 and 2016
in which respondents were asked questions about their willingness to
express their opinions about the refugee crisis in Europe.
The Swedish government changed its refugee policy from an “opendoor policy” to one of the most restrictive in Europe in late fall 2015
(Ghersetti & Odén, in press).1 Because of the policy change, we are
able to measure people’s readiness to share opinions about the refugee
crisis just before the policy changed and after the change was made.
This makes it possible to evaluate whether respondents changed their
willingness to speak out when the opinion climate changed.
By studying the refugee crisis, the study also fulfills one of the
important assumptions of the spiral of silence—the requirement of
a value-laden issue. Immigration and refugees have a strong moral
component and are controversial and therefore in line with NoelleNeuman’s argument that it is only from a moral or normative element
that one can fear the threat of isolation (Gearhart & Zhang, 2015;
Noelle-Neuman, 1984; Scheufele & Moy, 2000). This will of course
also be a good example of an issue were there are competing frames
and opinions. The empirical aim is therefore to analyze to what extent
individuals change their willingness to express their opinions when
government policy concerning a value-laden issue changes.
The organization of the article is as follows. The next section reviews the key assumptions and results of spiral of silence research. This
framework is used in more detail to discuss some shortcomings and
criticisms of spiral of silence research. On the basis of previous findings,
a number of hypotheses are proposed, and thereafter the methodology
and measures used in the study are described. After presenting the results, the article ends with conclusions, a discussion of the limitations
of the study, and implications of the results for crisis communication.
The Spiral of Silence: Theory and Previous Findings

One of the important needs of the spiral of silence theory is a value-laden
issue. As said earlier, fear of isolation is only relevant when the question
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at hand is controversial. In spiral of silence research, immigration is
categorized as a transitory issue (Gearhart & Zhang, 2015). Transitory
issues are not constantly in the public eye but reemerge from time to
time. The issue salience of immigration has increased during the last
decade in Sweden and Europe in general (Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup,
2008). Immigration in 2015 was, for the first time, viewed as the most
important societal issue among Swedish citizens (53% mentioned immigration as an important societal issue; Ohlsson, Ekengren, & Solevid,
2016), and immigration was also the most prominent issue during the
2014 election campaign in the news media (Johansson, 2017). Analyses
of the news media content of the election also indicates a strong focus
on immigration, and the refugee crisis was the dominant news story
during fall 2015 (Ghersetti & Odén, in press).
Some studies of the spiral of silence have focused on immigration
to test the theory. Matthes, Morrison, and Schemer (2010) analyzed the
national referendum about the naturalization of Swiss immigrants. The
results provided empirical support because those perceived as being
a minority expressed their opinions to a lesser extent. This tendency
was especially prevalent among those who were less convinced of their
opinions. Similar empirical support was also found in a study using
Asian immigration to Australia as a case (Louis, Duck, Terry, & Lalonde,
2010). Gearhart and Zhang (2015) also included a question on immigration (if undocumented immigrants should have the opportunity
to receive permanent residency) when testing different types of issues
and the spiral of silence theory. The authors found robust support for
the spiral of silence theory related to both immigration and the other
investigated issues (abortion and gay marriage).
A recurrent criticism of spiral of silence research is the lack of longitudinal studies. In most cases, research uses cross-sectional data and
can only, as Matthes and Hayes (2016) put it, analyze the social conformity hypothesis. Cross-sectional data measure at a single moment the
difference between respondents expressing their opinions and those
being silent. However, this does not capture the dynamics of opinion
change, which is one of the central aspects of the theory. To investigate
if the opinion climate leads to changes in the willingness to speak out
(the change hypothesis), studies over time are needed. Noelle-Neuman
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(1984) used trend survey data to demonstrate how aggregate opinions
increased or decreased depending on the opinion climate. As Matthes
and Hayes (2016) noted, this might give an intuitive understanding of
the phenomenon, but it is not a proper way to study changes on an
individual level and might also suffer from ecology fallacy. Trend survey
data are therefore not appropriate to study the dynamics of the spiral
of silence theory. A few studies have used panel data. Shamir (1997)
used a two-wave panel to investigate the spiral of silence and climate
change, and McDonald, Glynn, Kim, and Ostman (2001) used a fourwave panel from 1948 and conducted a secondary analysis on opinion
climate and candidate preference.
The asylum regime in Sweden has been generous and sometimes
described as an “open-door policy” (Ghersetti & Odén, in press). The
policy had broad support among the political parties, and only the
nationalist-populist Swedish Democrats (13% in the 2014 general election) opposed the policy. It should also be noted that Swedes are more
open to immigrants and welcoming refugees compared to citizens in
the rest of Europe (Sides & Citrin, 2007).
The refugee situation escalated during fall 2015, when 10,000 refugees arrived in Sweden every week and Migration Agency of Sweden
estimates claimed that 190,000 would seek asylum in Sweden in 2015
(in reality, it was 162,000).2 The Dublin Convention states that refugees should seek protection in the first European Union (EU) land
they enter,3 but most EU countries let refugees move to other countries. Sweden and Germany were considered popular because of their
generous refugee policies, but the number of refugees caused strong
tensions in the asylum-seeking process in Sweden (and Germany), not
least in terms of housing. The Swedish government (a coalition of the
Social Democrats and the Green Party), therefore, decided to change
the policy, and in November 2015, identity checks were imposed on all
modes of transport to Sweden, and the right to bring families to Sweden
was severely restricted. In one day, Sweden had changed its refugee
policy from being the most generous in the EU to being one of the
most restrictive. The only party that opposed the new policy was the
Left Party, with less than 10% support (Ghersetti & Odén, in press). The
refugee situation in Sweden (and Europe) can therefore these years be
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described in terms of a crisis as defined by Ulmer, Sellnow, and Seeger
(2007): “a specific, unexpected, non-routine event or series of events
that creates a high level of uncertainty and a significant or perceived
threat to high priority goals” (p. 7).
From what we know from opinion research, we can expect changes
in public opinion when policies change. Zaller (1992) discussed the elite
dominance in the news and concluded that the public reacts to elite
perspectives on information, and even if not everyone changes his or
her mind, changes in elite opinions will have a major impact on citizens’
views of societal issues (Zaller, 1992; see also Bennet, 1990; Iyengar &
Kinder, 1987). In fall 2015, many political parties abruptly changed their
refugee policies. Results also indicate that media coverage also generally
follows the framing of the changed policy (Ghersetti & Odén, in press).
Thus, in line with the spiral of silence theory, we would, before the
policy change, expect a greater willingness to express opinions about
the refugee crisis among respondents supporting a more generous
refugee policy compared to those holding a more restrictive view. This
scenario would probably change because of the changing policy, and
we would expect that those favoring a more restrictive view would be
more willing to share their opinions. Following this logic, the respondents supporting a more generous policy would be silenced. The study
hypotheses follow:
H1: Opinion congruency in refugee policy between respondents’ opin-

ions and government policy will be positively related to a willingness
to express opinions about the refugee crisis.
H2: When government policy changes to a more restrictive refugee
policy, respondents supporting a restrictive policy will increase their
willingness to express their opinions about the refugee crisis.
H3: When government policy changes to a more restrictive refugee
policy, respondents supporting a generous policy will decrease their
willingness to express their opinions about the refugee crisis.

The spiral of silence phenomenon is generally tested on speaking out
in front of unknown people (“talking to a stranger on the bus” is often
used in survey questions) and is generally believed to be weaker when
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it is related to the social groups to which the individual belongs. The
fear of isolation tends to be less pronounced when it comes to talking
with family, friends, and work colleagues and classmates (Hampton et
al., 2014). Against this background, we would expect the willingness to
express an opinion about the refugee crisis to be more accepted when
it comes to family and friends than other reference groups:
H4: The willingness to express opinions about the refugee crisis will
be more accepted when talking to family and friends, compared
with work colleagues and classmates and people respondents do not
know so well.

Because the elite opinion changed and the news media seemed to
report this change without challenging the dominant frame (Ghersetti
& Odén, in press), the two waves can be viewed as capturing the change
in opinion climate on an aggregate level. In this sense, one could argue that the design follows Noelle-Neuman’s (1984) original measure
of opinion climate, where she emphasized that the opinion climate is
about the factual gain or loss of ground among the population, not if
the individual also perceives this process. However, in most spiral of
silence research, a common way to measure the opinion climate is to
ask respondents how they perceive the general opinion position on
the issue and compare these answers with their own issue position
(Matthes & Hayes, 2016). Even so, there have been many suggestions
about how to measure the opinion climate. Some have asked about the
opinion among the general public (Shamir, 1997), while others have
focused on different reference groups (Moy, Domke, & Stamm, 2001;
Oshagan, 1996). An interesting and maybe also troublesome aspect in
previous research is the lack of mass media indicators in many studies.
Matthes and Hayes (2016) highlighted that only a few studies actually
include media content in their analyses and fail to establish a connection between the media content to which respondents are exposed
and their perception of the opinion climate. However, there are a few
examples of studies where the climate of opinion is measured as seen to
be conveyed through the mass media (Matera & Salwen, 1992). To arrive
at a more thorough understanding of the processes, the design of this
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study also includes an analysis of those respondents who changed their
inclination to speak out (see also Gearhart & Zhang, 2015) to evaluate
to what extent this disposition may be related not only to the changing
opinion climate but also to perceptions of the news media’s reporting
(media congruency), which can be viewed as a subjective measure of
the opinion climate. A proposed research question is as follows:
To what extent can respondents’ willingness to express their opinions
about the refugee crises be related to media congruency?
Method

To try to overcome some of the critical points referred to earlier, this
study of the spiral of silence in crisis events uses (a) a two-wave panel
study to be able to investigate changes in willingness to express opinions; (b) analysis of a real-world event—not a hypothetical—which
makes the situation more real for respondents (see Hayes, 2007); and,
because there was a dramatic change in elite opinion of the refugee
issue, where all major parties changed their opinions and decided to
change the policy, (c) observations of whether the change of (elite)
opinion climate also affects willingness to speak out.
Data Collection

Data for this study were collected in November 2015 (before the policy
change) and April 2016 (after the policy change) and were generated
by the Laboratory of Opinion Research (Lore) at the University of
Gothenburg using a Web survey panel of Swedish citizens. The panel
contains both self-recruited respondents (approximately 60,000) and
respondents recruited from probability-based population samples
(approximately 10,000).4
The chosen sample (2,500) was randomly selected from the citizen
panel and was stratified to reflect the general population according to
gender, age, and education. The first wave of the survey was collected
between October 26 and November 5, 2015, with a response rate of
63%. The second wave was sent out to respondents (who answered
the first survey) between April 21 and May 3, 2016. The response rate
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of the second wave was 71%. In both panel waves, 1,185 respondents
answered the questions.
The design using a two-wave panel (i.e., interviewing the same persons two times) enhances the possibility to track individual trajectories
over time. It makes it easier to rule out other factors that might affect
the results and strengthens claims of causal interpretations (Berrington,
Smith, & Sturgis, 2006).
Measures
Willingness to speak out. The criterion variable in this study was

measured by three questions capturing different social spheres: (a) family and friends, (b) work colleagues and classmates, and (c) strangers.
The following question was posed: “To what extent do you feel you
can speak out about the refugee crisis with your family and closest
friends?” Respondents were given a 5-point scale on which to place
themselves, ranging from 1 (to a very large extent) to 5 (to a very small
extent; Wave 1, M = 4.56, SD = 0.80; Wave 2, M = 4.57, SD = 0.78). The
same scale was used to ask if respondents were willing to speak out
about the refugee crisis with people at work and in school: “To what
extent do you feel you can speak out honestly about the refugee crisis
with work colleagues and classmates?” (Wave 1, M = 3.87, SD = 1.22;
Wave 2, M = 3.79, SD = 1.21).
To measure the willingness to speak out in relation to strangers,
the third question asked, “To what extent do you feel you can speak
honestly about the refugee crisis with people you don’t know well?”
Respondents were given a 5-point scale on which to place themselves,
ranging from 1 (to a very large extent) to 5 (to a very small extent; Wave 1,
M = 3.21, SD = 1.37; Wave 2, M = 3.04, SD = 1.38).
Own opinion. Respondents were asked to express their opinions
about the refugee issue by measuring to what extent they would favor
a more restrictive, status quo, or generous refugee policy. The question
was posed, “How well do the following statements comply with what you
think of the refugee reception?” Respondents answered using a 5-point
scale to express their opinions about the refugee issue, ranging from 1
(we should receive far fewer refugees than today) to 5 (we should accept far
more refugees than today; Wave 1, M = 2.77, SD = 1.42; Wave 2, M = 2.68,
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SD = 1.43). The variable was computed as a dichotomous variable in the
analysis (restrictive/generous policy opinion). Respondents with the
opinion of receiving fewer refugees in both waves and being pleased
with the present level in Wave 2 were considered as supporting a restrictive policy. With the same logic, respondents claiming Sweden
should accept more refugees in both waves and being content with the
present level of refugee reception in Wave 1 were coded as supporting
a generous policy. This recoding will of course create a loss of data
concerning attitude change, but the rationale is to be able to include
those changing their minds due to the policy change.
Perception of media congruency. As pointed out previously,
there is a discussion in spiral of silence research about the importance
of perceptions of opinion climate. The measure of media congruency
(evaluation of news media reporting) is viewed as an alternative way to
measure the subjective perception of the opinion climate. Even if this
is not a straightforward question of how a respondent’s own opinion
is related to the general opinion, we know from previous research that
people tend to generalize media content to the general view of societal
problems and their effect on public opinion (Gunther & Storey, 2003;
Perloff, 2015; Schulz & Roessler, 2012). Evaluation of news media reporting can therefore be seen as a proxy for the respondents’ views on
the opinion climate in society.
The respondents were asked to evaluate the news media reporting
of the refugee crisis with the question, “How do you think the news
media so far has reported on the refugee situation?” The scale had 7
points, ranging from 1 (not good at all) to 7 (very good; Wave 1, M = 4.22,
SD = 1.48; Wave 2, M = 3.89, SD = 1.45).
Noelle-Neuman (1984) raised the question of the importance of
personal traits related to the spiral of silence phenomenon (Neuwirth
et al., 2007; Scheufele & Moy, 2000). Controlling some of these aspects
by inclusion in the analysis were political interest, education, gender,
and age.
Political interest. A respondent’s political interest was measured
by the 4-point-scale question “How interested are you in politics?”
ranging from 1 (great interest) to 4 (no interest). The panel consisted of
respondents with a greater interest in politics compared with the general
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public (M = 1.74, SD = 0.66). This is related to the recruitment process
and the questions asked in the panel, where societal issues dominated.
Education. In the survey, respondents answered a question about
their highest level of education with fixed response alternatives (only
elementary school; high school, less than 3 years; high school, 3 years
or longer; postsecondary education [not university], less than 3 years;
postsecondary education [not university], 3 years or longer; college/university, less than 3 years; college/university, 3 years or longer; PhD). Even
if the scale was ordinal, it was treated as interval in the analysis. The sample contained a larger number of people with college/university educations compared to the overall Swedish population (M = 6.91, SD = 1.87).
Gender. This variable is measured by a self-reported question with
three alternatives: woman, man, and other. Only four respondents
chose the last option, and they were excluded from the analysis. The
sample had a larger proportion of male respondents compared with
the general population (M = 1.52, SD = 0.50).
Age. Age was measured by the panelists’ self-reported years of
birth. The sample contained respondents aged between 18 and 72 years
(M = 47, SD = 13.99), which means that the sample contained more
middle-aged and fewer young (<30 years) and old (>70 years) people
compared with the population as a whole.
Results

The results in Table 1 indicate strong support for the proposed difference in the preparedness to give voice to opinions about the refugee
crisis dependent on to whom a person talks. Overall, respondents are
willing to express their opinions among family and friends, and the
policy change did not change this attitude at all (Wave 1, M = 4.56;
Wave 2, M = 4.57). As predicted in H4, respondents are a little less
comfortable speaking out on this issue when talking to their colleagues
and classmates, and over time, they tend to be less willing to express
their opinions (Wave 1, M = 3.87; Wave 2, M = 3.79). But even after the
policy change, a majority feel they can express their opinions when
talking to people they meet at work or school.
This tendency is even clearer when asking about talking to people

1.22
1.39

3.87
3.18

People you do not know so wellc

a

n = 1,124. bn = 1,110. cn = 1,123.

Work colleagues and classmates

0.80

SD

4.56

M

Wave 1

b

Family and friendsa

and People You Do Not Know So Well

3.03

3.79

4.57

M

Wave 2

1.38

1.21

0.78

SD

4.38

2.43

−0.35

t

0.13

0.07

0.01

D

0.000

0.015

0.724

Sig

TABLE 1 Willingness to Express Opinions About the Refugee Crisis When Talking to Family and Friends, Work Colleagues and Classmates,
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respondents do not know so well, both in terms of generally being less
willing to speak out and changing toward being more silent after the
policy change (Wave 1, M = 3.18; Wave 2, M = 3.03). On this general
level, we therefore discover a significant tendency toward a more silenced public opinion, in terms of being willing to express opinions
outside the family setting. Even so, the effect size (d = .013, d = .07)
indicates that the magnitude of the policy change on the willingness
to speak opinions in public is rather low. It should also be noted that
a majority of all respondents feel they can talk about the refugee crisis
even if they talk to people they do not know so well, both before and
after the policy change.
But are these tendencies uniform, or do they, as H1, H2, and H3
predicted, depend on the opinions about the refugee issue among the
respondents? In Table 2, the analysis is separated among those who
support a generous and a more restrictive refugee policy.
Moving on to the first (H1) hypothesis, we expected to find a correlation between supporting the government policy on the refugee issue
and a willingness to speak out. However, the results show that those
favoring a more generous refugee policy to a larger extent are willing
to express their opinions about the refugee crisis, both before and
after the policy change (family and friends, M = 4.86/4.81; work colleagues and classmates, M = 4.48/4.30; people you do not know so well,
M = 3.97/3.68). The difference compared with respondents favoring
a more restrictive policy is significant, where a clear majority instead
are less comfortable expressing their opinions (family and friends,
M = 4.33/4.37; work colleagues and classmates, M = 3.33/3.37; people
you do not know so well, M = 2.46/2.46). On the basis of these two
measurement points, it seems like those supporting a more restrictive
policy are less likely to express their opinions, even if the policy has
changed, favoring their position. H1 can therefore only be partly supported.
The second (H2) and third (H3) hypotheses focused on changes of
expressing opinions, not the majority/minority position. H2 must be
rejected because there was no change among those supporting a restrictive policy before and after the policy change, independent of whom
they talk to. Even if the policy change supported their opinions, they

3.97

c

3.33
2.46

Work colleagues and classmatese

People you do not know so welld

1.30

1.32
2.46

3.37

4.37

3.68

4.30

4.81

M

Wave 2

1.33

1.27

0.92

1.21

0.96

0.51

SD

−0.04

−0.75

−1.18

5.58

3.62

2.03

T

0.00

0.04

0.06

0.25

0.16

0.10

D

0.97

0.45

0.24

0.000

0.000

0.043

Sig.

Note. The group categorized as rejecting restrictive refugee policy contains respondents claiming they want Sweden to accept more refugees in
both waves and those stressing the present level of refugee reception is acceptable in Wave 1. The group categorized as supporting a restrictive
refugee policy contains respondents claiming they want Sweden to accept fewer refugees in both waves and those stressing the present level
of refugee reception is acceptable in Wave 2.
a
n = 496. bn = 491. cn = 495. dn = 303. en = 297.

4.33

Family and friendsd

Restrictive
0.94

1.10

4.48

Work colleagues and classmatesb

People you do not know so well

0.81

4.86

0.46

SD

Family and friendsa

Generous

M

Wave 1

and People You Do Not Know So Well by Respondents Supporting a Generous or Restrictive Refugee Policy

TABLE 2 Willingness to Express Opinions About the Refugee Crisis When Talking to Family and Friends, Work Colleagues and Classmates,
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Predictors That Impact the Willingness to Express Opinions About the Refugee
Crisis in Conversations with Family and Friends, Work Colleagues and Classmates, and
People You Do Not Know So Well
TABLE 3

Willingness to
speak out before
policy change

Willingness to speak
out after policy
change

Decreased
willingness to
speak out

Family and friends
Own opinion (generous policy)

.33***

.29***

−.11**

Media congruency

.03

.07*

−.04

Political interest (low)

−.01

−.08**

.06

Education (high)

−.07

−.07*

.00

Gender (woman)

−.07

−.06

.03

.02

.06

−.04

Age
Adjusted R² (%)

10

9

1

N

816

818

815

Work colleagues and classmates
Own opinion (generous policy)

.48***

.43***

−.01

Media congruency

.08*

.12***

.02

Political interest (low)

−.03

−.10**

.08*

Education (high)

−.04

−.10**

.04

Gender (woman)

.01

.02

−.01

Age

.04

.04

.00

Adjusted R² (%)

20

12

0

N

815

811

807

People you do not know so well
Own opinion (generous policy)
Media congruency

.50***

.12**

.09*

.05

−.04

−.09*

.06

Education (high)

.03

−.05

.02

Gender (woman)

−.02

−.06

−.03

.04

−.01

Political interest (low)

Age

.11**

.45***

.08*

Adjusted R² (%)

28

19

2

N

816

817

814

Note. Values are ordinary least squares, standardized regression coefficients. The dependent
variables are created by computing the variable willingness to speak out in the two waves, where
respondents could be more/less willing to speak out. The dichotomized variable for decreased
willingness to speak out comprises those less inclined to express their opinions compared with
those having the same opinion in both waves and those being more motivated to speak out.
The media congruency measure is the absolute difference in opinion about the media reporting
and respondents’ own issue opinions in both waves. Tests to see if the data met the assumption
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of collinearity indicated that multicollinearity was not a concern (values ranging between the
four regression models, own opinion, tolerance = .78–.82, VIF = 1.22–1.28; media congruency,
tolerance = .85–.90, VIF = 1.12–1.18; political interest, tolerance = .93–.94, VIF = 1.06–1.07; education,
tolerance = .90–.91, VIF = 1.05–1.10; gender, tolerance = .88–.89, VIF = 1.13; age, tolerance = .95,
VIF = 1.05–1.06).
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

still felt hesitant to speak out in public about their opinions. Moving
on to H3, we find clear support for what was expected. Respondents
supporting a more generous policy have to some extent been silenced.
After the policy change, significantly fewer respondents were willing to
express their views on the refugee crisis. This can be found independent
of social sphere, even if the tendency is clearly related to social groups
outside family and close friends.
To further examine the mechanisms of the spiral of silence, Table 3
shows to what extent changes in the willingness to speak out are related
to a person’s own opinion and perception of media congruency. We
also control the results by demographics, which sometimes are treated
as personal traits with a possible influence on willingness to speak out
in public.
The results of three regression models are shown in Table 3, where
the dependent variable measures respondents’ willingness to express
their opinions, both at and between the two measurement points.
The first two models analyze the data as cross-sectional data to see if
media congruency affects the predisposition to speak out before and
after the policy change. The last model analyzes changes and whether
media congruency has an impact on opinion change (i.e., less willing
to express opinions).
In all three social spheres, we find that issue position has an impact
on the respondents’ willingness to reveal their opinions about the refugee crisis, both before and after the policy change (family and friends,
β = .33/.29; work colleagues and classmates, β = .48/.43; people you do
not know so well, β = .50/.44). The more a person supports a generous policy, the more willing he or she is to speak out. This is the same
tendency we saw in Tables 1 and 2.
Also, media congruency has an impact on the tendency to speak
out. Respondents who are more critical toward the media reporting
also seem to be less inclined to reveal their opinions. This is found in
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all social spheres after the policy change (family and friends, β = .07;
work colleagues and classmates, β = .12; people you do not know so
well, β = .09). Before the change of policy, the effect of media congruency was significant for talking to people at work and in school,
β = .08, and strangers, β = .11, but not in discussions among family and
friends, β = .03.
Political interest also affected this opinion, especially after the policy
change. Those less interested in politics seem to be more inclined to
hide their opinions, independent of whom they talk to (family and
friends, β = −.08; work colleagues and classmates, β = −.10; people you
do not know so well, β = −.09). The same holds for lower educated
respondents, but only when speaking with family members and close
friends, β = −.08, and people at work and in school, β = −.10.
When analyzing the change of willingness to speak out, the results
indicate overall a weak relationship between the proposed variables
(i.e., low explained variance). The most important factor is a person’s
own opinion on the issue, but the effect goes in different directions,
depending on social sphere. Among family and friends, we find that
supporting a more generous policy does not lead to a decreased inclination to reveal opinions, β = −.11, but it does so when talking to strangers,
β = .12. Moreover, there seems to be no direct effect on the inclination
of changes in speaking out related to how news media performance
was evaluated and the respondents’ own opinions (media congruency). If someone changed his or her willingness to express his or her
views, this change may not be related to the person’s perceptions of
news media reporting. This does not, of course, rule out a possibility
of indirect media impact in line with the spiral of silence theory. As
said before, the media effect in the spiral of silence theory might be
unconscious.
The other predictors show no significant effect, except that increasingly age seems to be related to less willingness to talk about the
refugee issue with strangers. Being a man or a woman, being low or
highly educated, or having an interest in politics does not seem to
matter.

Expressing Opinions About the Refugee Crisis in Europe

75

Discussion

The spiral of silence is one of the most influential media effect theories
of the last half-century. Noelle-Neuman’s theory on how the media
influences people’s willingness to speak their minds in public has been
subject to many studies all over the world. However, the theory has been
criticized in terms of conceptualization (Neuwirth et al., 2007), design
(Matthes & Hayes, 2016), and generalization (Scheufele & Moy, 2000).
The present study analyzed changes over time in the willingness to
express opinions about the refugee crisis in Europe using a two-wave
Web-panel survey in Sweden in 2015–2016. In focus was the impact of
the changing government policy, which moved from a generous refugee
policy toward a more restrictive policy.
The posed hypotheses had mixed support. Government changes
in policy toward a more restrictive refugee policy did not change the
overall picture. Those supporting a more restrictive policy were still less
inclined to speak their true opinions about the refugee crisis, even if
the policy had changed in their favor. On the other hand, respondents
supporting a more generous refugee policy seemed to be more cautious
about expressing their opinions about the refugee crisis when talking
to strangers after the policy change. The tendency to hide opinions
about the refugee crisis was stronger when talking to strangers and less
pronounced in relation to work colleagues and classmates, and a vast
majority felt they could talk about the issue with family and friends.
When analyzing the research question about the extent to which
media congruency affects willingness to speak out over time, there was
no such influence. It is, however, important to understand the difference
between analyzing changes and the situation at a given moment. Media
congruency had a clear impact on the willingness to share opinions,
both before and after the policy change, but media congruency did not
affect changes in preferences to talk about the refugee crisis before and
after the policy change.
What might need further discussion in relation to the spiral in
the spiral of silence theory is the time lag in the process. Most studies include, in line with Noelle-Neuman’s suggestions about capturing dynamics of the opinion climate, measures used to understand
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respondents’ perceptions of whether their opinions are likely to become
majority or minority (Gearhart & Zhang, 2015; Jeffres, Neuendorf, &
Atkin, 2010; Noelle-Neuman, 1984). People who feel their opinions are
about to reflect the majority position are more inclined to speak out.
The change in the predisposition to express opinions on the refugee
issue follows this pattern for those rejecting a restrictive policy but
not among those supporting a restrictive policy. Five months after the
policy change, one could expect that those persons who were more
critical about accepting refugees would be more eager to speak out. But
according to the results, we do not see this development. In line with
what previous research has shown in asking about opinions being on
the rise or in decline, we should have seen such a change.
Situational explanations can be proposed to explain this lack of
willingness to speak out among those supporting a restrictive refugee
policy. Even if the policy has changed, many might still be uncertain if
this opinion is shared among the general public, not least because the
government made the decision with regret and claimed the restrictive
policy was not intended to be permanent. A fear of stigmatization might
therefore still be possible. Because the restrictive policy has not changed
since April 2016, more measurement points could clarify if there is a
time lag in processes of the spiral of silence. Over time, those favoring a
more restrictive policy might speak out, but the opinion change process
might be slower than 5 months. To further understand the dynamics
of the spiral of silence, one might therefore need more measurement
points. This also highlights that there might be different dynamics depending on respondents’ perceptions of whether they are in a majority
or minority position. Regarding the refugee issue, willingness to speak
out first changes among those who have the majority position. They
feel uncertain and become more silent as the refugee policy changes
to a position that is different from their own. Maybe those having the
minority position will change, but it will take longer before they dare
to speak out. They are not sure this change of policy position will last,
and even if there is a change of tone in the news media, reporting the
process of experiencing a majority position might take a while.
This might indicate there are different time lags in the spiral of silence dynamics depending on if one is to become part of the majority
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or minority opinion. Further research on the spiral of silence would be
beneficial to better emphasize the dynamics to be able to understand
how the spiral in the spiral of silence actually works. Other shortcomings of the present study can also be discussed. In terms of generalizability, a partly recruited panel of respondents might overestimate the
willingness to express opinions. Participating in a panel with surveys
predominately about politics will be more attractive to people interested
in politics, and dropout from the panel will be higher among those less
interested in politics.
Conclusion

Let us at last move back to where we started. What are the consequences for crisis communication and, more specifically, citizens’ sense
making of a crisis related to the spiral of silence? In the introductory
section of this article, concerns were raised about the possible difficulty discussing a controversial issue, such as the refugee crisis, in
the sense-making process. Strategies proposed by convergence theory
were addressed in terms of how people find and use information from
different sources, not least in discussion with other people to handle
competing information (Anthony et al., 2013; Sellnow et al., 2009). The
present study does not support the raised concerns. It seems like most
people are willing to discuss a controversial issue among both family
and friends and people with whom they work and go to school. People
even dare to expose their opinions about a value-laden issue like the
refugee crisis to people they do not know well. Even if there is a tendency toward a more silenced public opinion, it is not alarming when
talking to family and friends. So even if there is a spiral of silence, it
does not seem to undermine citizens’ sense-making processes in times
of crisis.
Bengt Johansson, PhD, is a professor in journalism and mass communication at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden. His research focus
is on crisis communication and political communication. He is vice
chair for the section Political Communication Research at the IAMCR.
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Notes

1. See https://www.migrationsverket.se/
2. https://www.migrationsverket.se/
3. See http://eur-lex.europa.eu
4. For more information about the panel, see http://www.lore.gu.se/

References
Anthony, K. E., Sellnow, T. L., & Millner, A. G. (2013). Message convergence
as a message-centered approach to analyzing and improving risk communication. Journal of Applied Communication Research, 41, 346–364.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00909882.2013.844346
Bennet, L. W. (1990). Toward a theory of press–state relations in the United
States. Journal of Communication, 56, 467–485. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460
-2466.1990.tb02265.x
Berrington, A., Smith, P., & Sturgis, P. (2006). An overview of methods for the
analysis of panel data. Southampton, England: ESRC National Centre for
Research Methods, University of Southampton.
Boin, A., t’Hart, P., & McConnell, A. (2009). Crisis exploitation: Political and
policy impacts of framing contests. Journal of European Public Policy, 16,
81–106. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760802453221
Boin, A., t’Hart, P., Stern, E., & Sundelius, B. (2005). The politics of crisis management: Public leadership under pressure. Cambridge, England: Cambridge
University Press.
Donsbach, W., Salmon, C. T., & Tsfati, Y. (2016). The legacy of spiral of silence
theory: An introduction. In W. Donsbach, C. T. Salmon, & Y. Tsfati (Eds.),
The spiral of silence: New perspectives on communication and public opinion
(pp. 1–18). New York, NY: Routledge.
Frandsen, F., & Johansen, W. (2017). Organizational crisis communication: A
multivocal approach. London, England: Sage.

Expressing Opinions About the Refugee Crisis in Europe

79

Gearhart, S., & Zhang, W. (2015, December 3). Same spiral different day?
Testing the spiral of silence across different issue types. Communication
Research. https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650215616456
Ghersetti, M., & Odén, T. (in press). Flyktingkrisen i medierna och opinion.
Stockholm, Sweden: MSB.
Glynn, C. J., Hayes, A., & Shanahan, J. (1997). Perceived support for one’s
opinions and willingness to speak out: A meta-analysis of survey studies
on the “spiral of silence.” Public Opinion Quarterly, 61, 452–463. https://
doi.org/10.1086/297808
Glynn, C. J., & Huge, M. E. (2016). Speaking in spirals: An up-dated metaanalysis of the spiral of silence. In W. Donsbach, C. T. Salmon, & Y. Tsfati
(Eds.), The spiral of silence: New perspectives on communication and public
opinion (pp. 65–72). New York, NY: Routledge.
Green-Pedersen, C., & Krogstrup, J. (2008). Immigration as a political issue in
Denmark and Sweden. European Journal of Political Research, 47, 610–634.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2008.00777.x
Gunther, A. C., & Storey, J. D. (2003). The influence of presumed influence. Journal of Communication, 35, 199–215. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2003
.tb02586.x
Hampton, K. N., Rainie, L., Lu, W., Dwyer, M., Shin, I., & Purcell, K. (2014).
Social media and the “spiral of silence.” Washington, DC: Pew Research
Center.
Hayes, A. (2007). Exploring the forms of self-censorship: On the spiral of
silence and the use of opinion expression avoidance strategies. Journal of
Communication, 57, 785–802. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2007.0
0368.x
Heath, R. L., & O’Hair, H. D. (2010). The significance of crisis and risk communication. In R. L. Heath & H. D. O’Hair (Eds.), Handbook of risk and
crisis communication (pp. 5–30). New York, NY: Routledge.
Iyengar, S., & Kinder, D. R. (1987). News that matters: Television and American
opinion. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Jeffres, L. W., Neuendorf, K. A., & Atkin, D. (2010). Spirals of silence: Expressing opinions when the climate of opinion is unambiguous. Political
Communication, 16, 115–131. https://doi.org/10.1080/105846099198686
Johansson, B. (2017). Medievalrörelsen 2014: En valrörelse i skuggan av en
orolig omvärld. In L. Truedsson & B. Johansson (Eds.), När makten står

80

johansson

på spel: Journalistik i valrörelser (pp. 22–57). Stockholm, Sweden: Institutet
för mediestudier.
Louis, W. R., Duck, J. M., Terry, D. J., & Lalonde, R. N. (2010). Speaking out on
immigration policy in Australia: Identity threat and the interplay of own
opinion and public opinion. Journal of Social Issues, 66, 653–672. https://
doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.2010.01669.x
Matera, F. R., & Salwen, M. B. (1992). Support for the Radio Marti among
Miami’s Cubans and non-Cubans. International Journal of International
Relations, 16, 135–144. https://doi.org/10.1016/0147-1767(92)90036-T
Matthes, J., & Hayes, A. T. (2016). Methodological conundrums in spiral of
silence research. In W. Donsbach, C. T. Salmon, & Y. Tsfati (Eds.), The
spiral of silence: New perspectives on communication and public opinion
(pp. 54–65). New York, NY: Routledge.
Matthes, J., Morrison, K. R., & Schemer, C. (2010). A spiral of silence for
some. Communication Research, 37, 774–800. https://doi.org/10.1177
/0093650210362685
McDonald, D. G., Glynn, C. J., Kim, S.-H., & Ostman, R. E. (2001). The spiral
of silence in the 1948 presidential election. Communication Research, 28,
139–155. https://doi.org/10.1177/009365001028002001
Moy, P., Domke, D., & Stamm, K. (2001). The spiral of silence and affirmative
action. Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, 78, 7–25. https://
doi.org/10.1177/107769900107800102
Neuwirth, K., Frederick, E., & Mayo, C. (2007). The spiral of silence and
fear of isolation. Journal of Communication, 57, 450–468. https://doi
.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2007.00352.x
Noelle-Neuman, E. (1984). The spiral of silence: Public opinion—our social
skin. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Ohlsson, J., Ekengren Oscarsson, H., & Solevid, M. (Eds.). (2016). Ekvilibrium.
Gothenburg, Sweden: SOM-institutet, Göteborgs Universitet.
Oshagan, H. (1996). Reference group influence on opinion expression. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 8, 335–354. https://doi
.org/10.1093/ijpor/8.4.335
Perloff, R. M. (2015). A three-decade retrospective on the hostile media effect.
Mass Communication and Society, 18, 721–729. https://doi.org/10.1080/15
205436.2015.1051234
Scheufele, D., & Moy, P. (2000). Twenty-five years of the spiral of silence: A

Expressing Opinions About the Refugee Crisis in Europe

81

conceptual review and empirical outlook. International Journal of Public
Opinion Research, 12, 3–28. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/12.1.3
Schulz, A., & Roessler, P. (2012). The spiral of silence and the Internet: Selection of online content and the perception of the public opinion climate in
computer-mediated communication environments. International Journal of
Public Opinion Research, 24, 346–367. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/eds022
Seeger, M. L., & Sellnow, T. W. (2016). Narratives of crisis: Telling the stories of
ruin and renewal. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Sellnow, T. L., Ulmer, R. R., Seeger, M. W., & Littlefield, R. S. (2009). Effective
risk communication: A message-centered approach. New York, NY: Springer.
Sellnow, T. W., & Seeger, M. W. (2013). Theorizing crisis communication.
Chichester, England: John Wiley.
Shamir, J. (1997). Speaking up and silencing out in the face of a changing
climate of opinion. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 74,
602–614. https://doi.org/10.1177/107769909707400313
Sides, J., & Citrin, J. (2007). European opinion about immigration: The role
of identities, interests and information. British Journal of Political Science,
37, 477–504. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123407000257
Ulmer, R. R., Sellnow, T. L., & Seeger, M. L. (2007). Effective crisis communication: Moving from crisis to opportunity. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Vigsø, O., & Odén, T. (2016). The dynamics of sensemaking and information seeking in a crisis situation. Nordicom Review, 37, 71–84. https://doi
.org/10.1515/nor-2016-0003
Zaller, J. (1992). The nature and origins of mass opinion. Cambridge, England:
Cambridge University Press.

